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Canons to Create Ties
And Canons to Break Them
by Steve R. Johnson
The human spirit can
be deeply stirred by art
for its own sake, but there
is special magic when the
esthetic combines with
the practical. It was in
this sense that Charles W.
Elliot, for decades presi-
dent of Harvard Univer-
sity, once declared that he
found great beauty in the
shape of the handle of an
American ax. In the same
fashion, beauty resides in well-made statutory inter-
pretation arguments.
Over the millennia, scores of principles of con-
struction have evolved, all of them useful in the
right contexts.1 Usually, more than one principle can
plausibly be maintained to apply to the given case,
and often those multiple guides appear to point in
different directions.2 Accordingly, almost every law-
yer can make a journeyman-level statutory interpre-
tation argument in a case. Fewer, however, are the
advocates who can make a master-level argument,
one in which multiple themes are combined to pro-
duce an explanation of the statute both pleasing to
the artistic impulse and useful to the resolution of
the controversy before the court.3
A recent Florida tax case — Alachua County v.
Expedia4 — illustrates the interplay of multiple con-
structional themes and the beauty that their nu-
anced harmonization can produce. I do not intend to
engage all of the dimensions of Expedia. Instead, I
will emphasize the interplay of several principles in
the case, particularly how some canons were used to
initially create a tie between the revenue authorities
and the taxpayers and then how other canons were
advanced — sometimes persuasively, sometimes not
— to break that tie.
The first section below describes the controversy
in Expedia. The second section explores how the
‘‘ordinary understanding’’ canon was used by the
majority and the dissent, leaving the parties in
essential equipoise at that level. The third section
examines how the majority used the pro-taxpayer
1See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, ‘‘Some Reflections on the
Reading of Statutes,’’ 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 544 (1947).
(‘‘Insofar as canons of construction are generalizations of
experience, they all have worth.’’) Not all agree. E.g., Richard
A. Posner, ‘‘Statutory Interpretation — in the Classroom and
in the Courtroom,’’ 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 800, 806 (1983) (opining
that most canons ‘‘are just plain wrong’’); James C. Thomas,
‘‘Statutory Construction When Legislation Is Viewed as a
Legal Institution,’’ 3 Harv. J. Leg. 191, 210 (1966) (urging that
constructional canons ‘‘be abolished and eliminated from the
legal vocabulary’’).
2Every law student has heard of Professor Llewellyn’s
‘‘dueling canons’’ article. Karl Llewellyn, ‘‘Remarks on the
Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About
How Statutes Are to Be Construed,’’ 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 401
(1950) (‘‘there are two opposing canons on almost every
point’’). However, more recent scholarship has challenged the
fairness of Llewellyn’s comparisons. E.g., Antonin Scalia and
Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal
Texts 59-60 (2012); Michael Sinclair, ‘‘‘Only a Sith Thinks Like
That’: Llewellyn’s ‘Dueling Canons,’ Pairs Thirteen to Six-
teen,’’ 53 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 953 (2008/2009); Michael
Sinclair, ‘‘‘Only a Sith Thinks Like That’: Llewellyn’s ‘Dueling
Canons,’ Eight to Twelve,’’ 51 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 1003
(2006-2007); Michael Sinclair, ‘‘‘Only a Sith Thinks Like
That’: Llewellyn’s ‘Dueling Canons,’ One to Seven,’’ 50 N.Y. L.
Sch. L. Rev. 919 (2005-2006).
3Scalia and Garner, supra note 2, at 59, ‘‘It is a rare case in
which each side does not appeal to a different canon to
suggest its desired outcome. The skill of sound construction
lies in assessing the clarity and weight of each clue and
deciding where the balance lies.’’ (emphasis in original); see
also Henry M. Hart Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal
Process: Basic Problems in the Making of Law 1191 (William
N. Eskridge Jr. and Philip P. Frickey eds. 1994) (‘‘Of course
there are pairs of maxims susceptible of being invoked for
opposing conclusions. Once it is understood that meaning
depends upon context, and that context varies, how could it be
otherwise?’’).
4Alachua County v. Expedia, Inc., __ So. 3d __, 2013 WL
709561 (Fla. App. Feb. 28, 2013). The Expedia opinion has not
yet been released for publication in the permanent law
reports. Until so released, it remains subject to revision or
withdrawal. I am grateful to Mark E. Holcomb, Esq., for
bringing Expedia to my attention. Holcomb represented some
of the companies in the case.
(Footnote continued in next column.)
State Tax Notes, May 13, 2013 531
(C) Tax Analysts 2013. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
canon to break that equipoise in favor of the tax-
payer. It also compares Expedia to a federal case in
which the court chose not to follow the same path.
The fourth section considers how the dissent ad-
vanced a different principle — the ‘‘substance over
form’’ rule — to attempt to resolve the equipoise in
favor of the government units.
The Expedia Controversy
New technology spawns new business opportuni-
ties — and, for perennially cash-strapped govern-
ments, new revenue opportunities. As everyone ex-
posed to television commercials knows, a profusion
of companies now offer discounted hotel prices. Can
the tax man fail to follow that scent?
Expedia is among the most recent of a long line of
cases involving the determination of tax liability in
the new travel industry.5 The case involves Florida’s
tourist development tax, levied by localities under
the state’s Local Option Tourist Development Act.6 It
presents the question of the proper base on which
the tax applies.
Online travel companies (OTCs) have websites
that permit potential customers to glean information
comparing competing hotels, airlines, and auto
rental companies. The OTC submits the customer’s
reservation request to the hotel or other service pro-
vider. If the hotel chooses to accept the reservation,
it makes the reservation in the customer’s name.
Two models are used in the industry. Under the
‘‘merchant model,’’ the OTC collects the payment
from the customer and sends part of it to the hotel.
The customer does not pay the hotel directly. In
contrast, under the ‘‘agency model,’’ the customer
pays the hotel for the room. The hotel then pays a
commission to the OTC.7 The eight companies that
were parties in Expedia used the merchant model.
The tourist development tax, enacted in 1977,
allows counties to assess a ‘‘bed tax’’ regarding hotel
stays in their jurisdictions. It states:
It is declared to be the intent of the Legislature
that every person who rents, leases, or lets for
consideration any living quarters or accommo-
dations in any hotel, apartment hotel, motel,
resort motel . . . for a term of 6 months or less is
exercising a privilege which is subject to taxa-
tion under this section, unless such person
rents, leases, or lets for consideration any living
quarters or accommodations which are exempt
according to the provisions of chapter 212.8
The chapter 212 reference is to the transients
rentals tax enacted in 1949. That measure provides:
It is hereby declared to be the legislative intent
that every person is exercising a taxable privi-
lege who engages in the business of renting,
leasing, letting, or granting a license to use any
living quarters or sleeping or housekeeping
accommodations in, from, or a part of, or in
connection with any hotel.9
It is clear that the OTCs are responsible for
collecting the tax and remitting it to the revenue
authorities.10 But fixing the duty to collect does not
fix the incidence of the tax and does not resolve the
extent of the tax base.
Many counties brought suit seeking judicial dec-
laration that the tourist development tax applies to
the full amounts that the OTCs collect from the
customers. The OTCs countered that the tax applies
only to the amounts paid by the OTCs, on the
customers’ behalf, to the hotels, and does not apply
to the additional amounts collected by the OTCs but
retained by them as their compensation.
The trial court ruled in favor of the OTCs. On
appeal, the district court identified ‘‘the crux of this
dispute [as] determining what is the privileged ac-
tivity which the Tourist Development Tax taxes —
renting a room to a tourist, or a tourist renting a room
from a hotel?’’ In other words, ‘‘did the Legislature
declare that it is a privilege to rent a hotel room in
Florida, or did it declare that it is a privilege to op-
erate a hotel in this state?’’11 If the taxable privilege
is the act by the tourists, the whole amounts paid by
them would be taxable and the counties would pre-
vail. However, if the taxable privilege is the act by the
hotels, only the amount paid to the hotels (not the
amount retained by the OTCs) would be taxable and
the OTCs would prevail.12
5Other such cases include Mayor & City Council of Balti-
more v. Priceline.com Inc., 2012 WL 3043062 (D. Md. 2012);
Village of Rosemont v. Priceline.com Inc., 2011 WL 4913262
(W.D. Ill. 2011); City of San Antonio v. Hotels.com, 2008 WL
2486043 (W.D. Tex. 2008); City of Charleston v. Hotels.com,
LP, 586 F. Supp. 2d 538 (D.S.C. 2008); Expedia, Inc. v. City of
Columbus, 681 S.E.2d 122 (Ga. 2009); Travelscape, LLC v.
South Carolina Dep’t of Revenue, 705 S.E.2d 28 (S.C. 2011).
6Fla. Stat. section 125.0104.
72013 WL 709561, at *1 and n.2.
8Fla. Stat. section 125.0104(3)(a)(1).
9Fla. Stat. section 212.03(1)(a).
10Fla. Stat. sections 125.0104(3)(f) (tourist development
tax) and 212.03(2) (transient rentals tax).
112013 WL 709561, at *2 (emphasis in original).
12Plainly, that dispute could have been avoided by more
precise legislative drafting. Also, the ‘‘It is hereby declared to
be the legislative intent’’ language is curious. What the
Legislature does — what tax it enacts — matters more than
what the Legislature intends. See, e.g., In re Sinclair, 870
F.2d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1989); Lawrence H. Tribe, ‘‘Com-
ment,’’ in Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal
Courts and the Law 65, 66 (1997) (‘‘it is the text’s meaning,
and not the content of anyone’s expectation or intentions, that
binds us as law’’) (emphasis in original).
Interpretation Matters
532 State Tax Notes, May 13, 2013
(C) Tax Analysts 2013. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
‘Ordinary Understanding’ and Equipose
There were many aspects of Expedia. For in-
stance, both the district court majority and the
dissent entertained ‘‘plain meaning of the statute’’
arguments,13 both tussled about the significance of
an earlier case,14 and both probed the relationship of
the tourist development tax and the earlier tran-
sient rentals tax as statutes in pari materia.15
This column will not engage all the arguments in
the case, in part because their ilk have been ex-
plored in previous installments.16 Instead, we will
selectively treat several aspects of the case.
‘‘When the words of a statute are unambiguous,
[the] first canon is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is
complete.’’’17 Thus, construction of the critical statu-
tory terms — such as ‘‘rents, leases, or lets for consid-
eration’’ — was central to both the majority and dis-
senting opinions. The general rule, and the rule in
Florida,isthatstatutorytermsareunderstoodintheir
ordinary,everydaysenses,unlesscontextreveals that
they have technical, term-of-art meanings.18
Both the Expedia majority and dissent accepted
that the critical terms of the tourist development tax
had to be taken in their ordinary, everyday signifi-
cation, but they went in different directions starting
from that common origin. For the majority:
To ‘‘rent, lease or let’’ in ordinary meaning
denotes the granting of possessory or use rights
in property. Inherent in that idea is the notion
that one actually has sufficient control of the
property to be entitled to grant possessory or
use rights. Thus, the consideration received for
the ‘‘lease or rental’’ is that amount received by
the hotels for the use of their room, and not the
mark-up profit retained by the [OTCs] for
facilitating the room reservation.19
The majority fortified that with citation to Black’s
Law Dictionary and concluded that the OTCs ‘‘are
simply conduits through which consumers can com-
pare hotels and rates and book a reservation at the
chosen hotel. They do not grant possessory or use
rights in hotel properties owned or operated by
third-party hoteliers.’’20
If the terms of the tourist
development tax, taken in their
ordinary sense, could point either
in favor of or against the OTCs,
the pro-taxpayer canon breaks the
tie in their favor.
The Expedia dissent countered with its own dic-
tionaries and its own ‘‘ordinary, everyday meaning’’
definition of the critical statutory language. Accord-
ing to the dissent, ‘‘the problem with [the majority’s]
argument is that the terms ‘rent’ and ‘lease’ are also
used to describe an action taken by the person who
pays for the right to occupy the property.’’21 In other
words, ‘‘because these terms can be used inter-
changeably to describe the action by either party in
the making of a lease or rental agreement, we cannot
say for certain that they are used in the statute to
describe the act of providing a hotel room. . . . We
could just as well read the phrase . . . to mean any
person who pays money to a hotel for the privilege of
staying there.’’22
The sides’ arguments are not free of doubt, but
assume arguendo their central thrusts. By using the
same canon — the everyday meaning principle — but
reversing the direction of the verbs, the parties (and
the majority and dissent) arrived at opposite posi-
tions.Atthat level, theyare inequipoise.Tobreakthat
tie,thesidesresorted—withdifferentlevelsofsuccess
— to secondary canons. It is to them that we now turn.
Majority’s Canon to Disturb Equipoise
A court’s first resort should be to discover the
better outcome through fair and reasonable applica-
tion of neutral constructional principles.23 Should
that effort lead to no clear result — as arguably was
the case in Expedia — the court must turn to
background constructional principles. The Expedia
trial court and appellate majority found that prin-
ciple: the pro-taxpayer canon.
132013 WL 709561, at *2 (Thomas, J., writing for the
court); id. at *8 (Padovano, J., dissenting).
14Miami Dolphins, Ltd. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 394
So. 2d 981 (Fla. 1981); see 2013 WL 709561, at *3 (majority
opinion), id. at *6 (dissenting opinion).
152013 WL 709561, at *3 (majority opinion); id. at *9
(dissenting opinion).
16E.g., Steve R. Johnson, ‘‘Supertext and Consistent Mean-
ing,’’ State Tax Notes, May 25, 2009, p. 675; Johnson, ‘‘Use and
Abuse of ‘Plain Meaning,’’’ State Tax Notes, Sept. 22, 2008, p.
831.
17Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254
(1992). But see Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341
(1997). (‘‘The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is
determined by reference to the language itself, the specific
context in which that language is used, and the broader
context of the statute as a whole.’’).
18E.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 71 (1824); Fla. Dep’t of
Revenue v. New Seas Escape Cruises, Ltd., 894 So. 2d 954, 961
(Fla. 2005).
192013 WL 709561, at *4.
20Id. at *5 (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 1300 (7th ed.
1999)). Also, the OTCs cited other dictionaries in their briefs,
including Dictionary.com based on Random House Dictionary,
and Collins English Dictionary. See 2013 WL 709561, at *7
(dissenting opinion).
212013 WL 709561, at *7-*8 (citing over a half dozen
dictionaries).
22Id. at *8.
23See generally Johnson, ‘‘Tilted Versus Reasonable Inter-
pretation of Tax Laws,’’ State Tax Notes, Oct. 25, 2010, p. 277.
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